

The London Gazette.

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From Tuesday October 30. to Saturday November 3. 1744.

Translation of Letters from Feldt Marshal Schmettau, Minister from the King of Prussia at the Court of France, to the Emperor, and his Prussian Majesty, &c. referred to in the Queen of Hungary's Letter to the Circle of Swabia, published in last Gazette.

N^o 1.

S I R,

I Am obliged to tell your Sacred Imperial Majesty, that I do not comprehend in the least, why Marshal Seckendorff does not communicate a Word to me of the Conferences held between him and Marshal Noailles at Lauterbourg, either in relation to the Maintenance and Augmentation of your Imperial Majesty's Troops, or to the Forming of a sufficient Army to act immediately for your Majesty's Interests, or to a Plan of Operations for the next Campaign. One of the principal Points of my Instructions from the King my Master being, however, that I am to support, and speak in his Name, to the most Christian King, and all his Ministers, upon every Thing wherein your Majesty's Interests are concerned: But how is it possible I should do it, when every Thing is concealed from me? I am nevertheless persuaded, that your Imperial Majesty is convinced of my Zeal and Attachment to your Interests, and, I think, that in the present Situation of Affairs, the King my Master's Credit, and the Regard they have for him here, would have a good deal contributed towards the more speedy settling of the Sums and Troops, which are necessary for making the Imperial Army considerable enough, to be able to rely upon its own Strength, and likewise to the Assignment of sufficient Funds for the Augmentation of the Imperial Troops, and adding, towards the Spring, a sufficient Number of other German Troops, for enabling that Army to make Advances towards Austria on the right Side of the Danube, with all possible Vigour, as that of the King my Master will do on the Left.

I open my Heart to your Imperial Majesty in telling you, that if People do not proceed in this Business with more Cordiality for the

Publick Good, by setting aside the Passions, Factions and Brigues, which I observe here with the greatest Grief, the finest Aspects of Affairs in the World, and the more than sufficient Materials which we have in our Hands, will come to nothing, and be dissipated a second Time.

Marshal Noailles, with whom (as far as I can judge by Appearances) I am very well reconciled, brings nothing to a Conclusion, because he sticks to no Plan. The last is with him always in the Right. However, I dare assure your Majesty, in all Secrecy and Confidence, that the most Christian King is well apprized and persuaded of the Faults, that were committed from the 12th to the 24th, and since that Time, and that the Credit of Noailles is very much sunk. A Day has not passed, in which I have not solicited the Ministry here, especially Argenson and Noailles, for the Compleating your Majesty's Army, that it may be, at least, of 45,000 fighting Men, and that they would give eight Pieces of Battering Cannon, and four Mortars, (since Seckendorff has asked no more) as well as the Pontons. But as the said Seckendorff does not correspond with me, I never know Things till after the Evil has happened; for Example, the six French Battalions and fourteen Squadrons I thought had joined: I thought that the eight Battering Cannon and four Mortars, with the Pontons, would have been sent immediately from Villengen to join the Army destin'd for Bavaria, as Noailles had assured me they would; but I learn To-day, that all That has not been done, and that very far from it, as Villengen has been abandoned by the Austrians, and that the French have taken Post there, the Artillery is carrying back towards Fribourg, to join the Army of France there, which is to form the Siege of that Place, and which will have invaded it in three Days Time.

I know also, only by the publick Way, that your Majesty designs to go and put yourself at the Head of your Army, and that you are to set out the 18th of September; but may I venture, Sir, to represent to your Majesty, that, in the present Circumstances, I think that Resolution

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lution premature. Your Majesty will run the Risk of Accidents, which are not suitable to your high Person: I think that you should first, before all, wait for the Compleating of that Army, by the Junction of the French, the Palatins, the Cannon, and the Pontons; and that even before that, Seckendorff should not advance too much, to run the Risk that the Austrians, spreading the Report that they are hastening towards Passau, and the Frontiers of Austria and Bohemia, should return with Force upon him, and give him a Blow, or at least make him retreat precipitately, which, as Affairs are, would be extremely prejudicial. Your Imperial Majesty will therefore be pleased to consider, how much more fatal it would be, if you were there in Person, or if only, when you should be there, you should meet with Obstructions to stop you. And, even though the Austrians should have retreated a good Way towards Passau, I do not think that your Majesty should join your Army before Seckendorff is Master of Donawerth, and of the Lech, in order to your Imperial Majesty's being able to march forward. I must submit one Thing more to your Majesty, which is, that if you go so soon to the Army, and that you require Marshal Belleisle to attend you, you take away, too soon, the only Man here about the King, who is for your Majesty and for the King my Master, and give Room to Belleisle's Enemies to work against him; whereas going later, Belleisle might employ himself in causing all the French Troops, which will not be wanted at Fribourg, to advance into Suabia, on the Side of the Iller; and as they would then give him the Command, he might, according to the Wants of that Body of Troops, go and return to your Imperial Majesty's Army, and to your Person, and second your Enterprizes. Nay, Belleisle would work with his most Christian Majesty, and has already got Tancin and Argenfon, as well as the Comptroller General, to join in his Sentiments; that is to say, that it may be the Troops of France who make the Siege of Ingolstadt, to the End that your Imperial Majesty's whole Army may go to the Inn and to Passau. I beseech your Imperial Majesty to reflect upon all this. Moreover, Sir, it appears to me, that it is no longer expedient, that your Majesty should have such punctilious Regards for the Princes and Circles, but that the Time is come, that it must either bend, or break, and that any Neutrality in the Empire can no longer subsist. It will be Right immediately to declare to the Circles of Suabia and Franconia, that they must be for or against the Head of the Empire; that your Majesty cannot now go on upon any other Foot with your Allies, in order to the Recovery of your Estates, and your Support in the Possession of them: That for this Effect, the Communication with your Allies through Suabia and Franconia, was indispensably neces-

sary to you, and that Germany could not be torn to Pieces by two Factions.

I am, with the most profound Veneration,
S I R,

Metz, Sept. 13, 1744. Your Sacred Imperial Majesty's most humble and most obedient,
the Marshal Count de Schmettau.

N^o 2.

Extract of Count Schmettau's Relation, wrote to the King of Prussia from Metz, September 16, 1744.

Argenson complained afterwards of Seckendorff's Manner of acting, who, not only gave him no Advice of his March, nor of his Views and Designs, though it would have been necessary for their co-operating in Conformity, but also, that M. de Seckendorff seemed to have Views quite different from those which I, as well as Mortagne, had given the Ministry here to understand; and that all this came but indirectly to him, through the Marshal de Noailles, who did not however himself, in any Manner, approve Seckendorff's Design of drawing with his Army to the left Side of the Danube, towards the Country of Anspach, and the Upper Palatinate, pretending to conform to your Majesty's Will. But as, in your Majesty's Letter of the 31st of August, the most Christian King had read, that your Intentions were, that the Imperial Army should be put in a Condition to follow the Enemy, and to enter, N. B. into Bavaria, they could not combine this Idea of Seckendorff's, which seemed quite opposite with what he would make Marshal Noailles believe was the Will of your Majesty. Marshal Belleisle being at the Door, Count d'Argenson called him in, and the Discourse, was concerning Seckendorff's Designs, and the Emperor's Intention of setting out the 17th of September to join his Army: Thereupon Belleisle drew out of his Pocket two Letters from Mortagne, dated from Lauffen upon the Neckar, if I mistake not, the 11th or 12th of September, which set forth, in a very sensible Manner, the Dissatisfaction at the Proceedings of the Imperial Army; that it wanted Forage, because it had been refused; that the States of Suabia were not to deliver any, in order to make an Advantage rather of the Undertakers, and pay ready Money for Bread and Forage. He wrote farther, that General Seckendorff availing himself of your Majesty's Will, seemed still to have an Idea of marching towards Franconia, saying, that he would turn afterwards towards Passau; but that he (Mortagne) saw clearly that all that tended only to his going on the Side of Anspach and Nuremberg, to find out his old Admodiators, and to cause the Provisions and Forage to be paid for, hinting very intelligibly, that there was neither Rhime nor Reason, but only Views of Interest in that Affair.

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It is impossible but your Majesty must know that I have at all Times taken Seckendorff's Part; and as nothing has passed since, which can so much as give a Suspicion that I have had the least Disgust from him, it is only, as your Majesty certainly sees, my Fidelity for the Service of your Majesty, which obliges me to relate all this to you. I do not think indeed that his Views of Interest therein are as Mortagne presumes, and as Belleisle and Argenfon also think; but I cannot however comprehend (unless your Majesty hath ordered Seckendorff's making that Motion to prevent the Junction of the Saxons with the Austrians) what Seckendorff can think of doing in the Upper Palatinate, leaving all the Danube and Bavaria to the Enemy, his Idea of turning afterwards towards Passau being then no longer practicable; for, if he is not Master of the right Side of the Danube, How will he attack Passau? The Enemy with 15000 Men will easily hinder him from passing the Danube so low, and they will post themselves between the Inn and the Danube near Passau. How does M. Seckendorff then propose to take them? He must even want Subsistence, because the Enemy, retiring from the Upper Palatinate, will certainly leave him nothing, should they even burn what they cannot carry off. If M. de Seckendorff does not enter by Dillingen and Lauingen into Bavaria, the Army of France cannot take Winter Quarters in Suabia upon the Iller; and the Austrians, passing the Danube with a strong Body, either again during this Autumn, or the Winter, on the Side of Donauwerth, or Ingolstadt, may be able to fall upon that Imperial Army, which could not, after having entered so far into the Upper Palatinate, but take Winter Quarters in Francony and a Part of Suabia, which is on the Left of the Danube, and be constantly exposed, besides what I have just mentioned, to the Incursions of great Parties of the Austrian irregular Troops, who may be able to carry off whole Bodies of them from their Quarters.

I have wrote twice to Seckendorff, since the Letter of the 20th, in the most friendly Manner that can be, desiring him to lay aside all Passion, and all that might pique him in the Points that I wrote to him in that Letter, since he would easily comprehend, that that had been wrote to push the Duke of Noailles to do better, and to act with more Vigour against the Enemy, and attack them before they could pass the Rhine; but that we ought to unite, when the Service of our Masters, and of the Common Cause, was concerned: But he has never answered me, and does not only communicate nothing to me, but acts also quite contrary to what I have wrote to him. I had demanded (for Example) 16 Battering Cannon and eight Mortars; he, to make a Merit to himself of his OEconomy in the Expences which that might occasion to France, said, that Half was enough for him; the Mar-

shal de Noailles having even declared, that he had told him by Word of Mouth, that perhaps he might still find Means to do for the present entirely without that Artillery. I had demanded the Junction of 10 French Battalions, and of 20 Squadrons; he said again, that it was too much, and that he asked but six Battalions, and 14 Squadrons. See there some Instances of his OEconomy, whereby he thinks to render himself very agreeable, whilst he loses by it the Main of the Plan, and Noailles has taken Advantage of it against Seckendorff himself; for two Days ago he replied to the Minister of War, that it was I who demanded double Quantities, whilst even the General who commanded the Army, and who ought to know the Wants of it better than I, did not demand them, and that he had not since insisted even upon the Junction of the French Troops.

Seckendorff has acted the same Part with Regard to the Plan of subsisting the Emperor's Troops; when, to shew that he knew how to maintain and recruit them at a much cheaper Rate than his Predecessor Count Torring, he demanded but six Millions of Livres Tournois, which the Court and the Comptroller General not only granted upon the Estimates that Seckendorff gave in for that Purpose, but which they have also exactly paid. It is not then surprising, that, when he saw he was grossly mistaken, and that every Thing was now wanting, that the Officers had six, and a great many nine Months Pay in Arrear; that neither Saddles, nor Arms, nor Regimentals for the Recruits, could be paid for, and was desirous to get off of it again, alledging, that it was not his Meaning to comprehend in those six Millions all these Particulars, the Ministry here should stick to their Point, and that M. Orry should tell me, that after this Rate they could depend upon no Establishment with M. Seckendorff; and that it being impossible in France, that after having formed the Estimates of the War for the Year, and given themselves all the Trouble to regulate the necessary Finances for it, they should be able afterwards to answer the Demands of all those who might say they had asked too little. I cannot even complain of M. Orry, for, upon all the Points that I have asked of him on the Part of your Majesty, he has shewn himself ready to comply with the best Grace in the World. He has given the 930,000 Livres that Marshal Noailles demanded for Recruiting the Emperor's Army, and, upon my Instances, he has augmented, by 100,000 Livres per Month, the Subsistence of the said Troops, and has moreover given separately 200,000 Livres for the extraordinary Occasions. He has promised likewise his Assistance in the Project of Augmentation to 60,000 Men for the next Campaign, as far as should depend upon the Finances required for it. This is the State Things are in with Regard to Marshal Seckendorff; I know not what your Majesty may



may think thereupon; but I ought to believe, that neither his Conduct in the Passage of the Schreck, if your Majesty is informed of all the Particulars, nor his Complaisance in approving all the miserable Management of M. de Noailles, nor his Halt on the 22d at Hochfeld, which even Noailles disapproves, nor the Manner in which he acts at present, can possibly please your Majesty. The Marshal Belleille is of the same Opinion, and in that Supposition we have already consulted between us who might be proposed for the Command of that Army, who may at the same Time be agreeable to your Majesty, and to the Emperor; the rather as Seckendorff, since last Year, has several Times given Hints that he wished nothing but to retire; and that so this Man, whether by Age, or I know not what other Reason, is become quite another from what I ever knew him, and takes Things in so wrong a Manner, as may overturn the whole Machine; and this is the greatest Difficulty we meet with, with Regard to the whole Plan of Operations, whether for the Remainder of this Campaign, or that of the ensuing one.

Mortagne and the Prince of Hildburghausen are the best Men in that Army; so after having looked all round without finding any one fit for it, I thought that the best Thing we could do in this Affair would be, as the Prince of Hildburghausen is already Quarter-Master-General, and consequently very much superior in Rank to Mortagne, though this latter has more Activity and better Notions as to Operations than the other, to join them together in such a Manner, that he should do nothing without the Advice and Approbation of Mortagne; and that Hildburghausen should have the Command of the Infantry, and Mortagne of the Cavalry, and Keyserstein of the OEconomy under the Emperor, and that in his Absence Hildburghausen should have the Command; and that previously, these two, viz. Hildburghausen and Mortagne, should unite themselves in Friendship, and promise so great a Deference for the Opinion of each other, and for the Service of their Master, as would give Reason to expect all the good Events possible.

I am pretty well acquainted with the Genius and Capacity of Hildburghausen, who, with great Mildness, has all the Courage and all the Sentiments proper for answering the Expectations which may be conceived of him. It would only be necessary, that the French Vivacity of Mortagne, and the natural Ambition of Men, who are desirous of being uppermost, and taking to themselves the Merit of every Action, should be temper'd in a proper Manner. But Mortagne is a very reasonable Man, so that if your Majesty would write him some Instructions thereupon, I make no Doubt but he would follow them. It would therefore belong to your Majesty to propose to the Emperor what is necessary therein, if you see no Hopes of pre-

serving Seckendorff, who seems to be willing to destroy himself. People are here extremely dissatisfied with him, the King as well as the Ministry.

N^o 3.

Memorial presented to his most Christian Majesty, after having first of all repeated it by Word of Mouth to him, upon the 13th of September.

THE first News that I am in Expectation of from the King my Master, throws me into a Perplexity which I am not able to express. The quiet Passage of the Queen of Hungary's Army over the Rhine, will have so sensibly afflicted his Majesty, that I am under the greatest Uneasiness for the Effect, which it shall have produced upon his Mind and upon that of our Allies. Promises had been given to the King my Master, that the Austrian Army should be considerably diminished. It is known, that from the 12th of August to the 23d, they were continually at Work upon their Retreat; nevertheless, they were so fortunate as to pass the Rhine without having suffered any considerable Loss. It is true, that that would not have happened, but for the most unfortunate of all Accidents which could have befallen us, that is, the Illness of his most Christian Majesty, which prevented the ready Execution of his Intentions in the Things which were promised to the King my Master. Accordingly his Majesty will never doubt, but that if this great Misfortune had not happened, the Austrian Army would not have been in a Condition to appear again upon the Theatre of the Empire, with that Boldness which their quiet Passage over the Rhine cannot fail to inspire them with.

The Courts of Vienna and London will avail themselves of that Event, to increase their Credit in Germany, in Holland, and in the North, and to procure themselves that Assistance which would have been refused them, if the Army of Prince Charles had received those Checks, which seemed inevitable to them, if Things had passed as they naturally ought to have done. It appears to me, that in order to remedy what has happened, which so strongly revives the Confidence of our Enemies, there are but three Methods to be pursued.

The first is, To procure for the Emperor, for the Remainder of this Campaign, and with the least Delay possible, an Army of 50 Battalions and 80 Squadrons, with the heavy Artillery that is proper.

The second is, That this very Army should be augmented, against the next Campaign, to the Number of 60,000 fighting Men, in order to push the Austrians with Vigour, and to give the Emperor and his Allies so great a Superiority in the Empire, that the Court of Vienna may at last be forced to come to a Peace.

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The third is, That his most Christian Majesty would be pleased to give Orders as soon as possible, for an Army of 45,000 Men to march to Hanover. This is the most important Article, because it takes in the three following Considerations.

First, The obliging the King of England to come to a speedy Accommodation; a Proof of which was seen in the Year 1741, by the sudden Sending of the Sieur Hardenberg to the Court of his most Christian Majesty.

Secondly, The bringing back the Elector of Cologne to more suitable Sentiments towards the Emperor and his Allies.

And, lastly, The third Consideration is the giving the Dutch so much Uneasiness, that upon the Retreat of the Hanoverians, their own Troops may also be recalled for the Defence of their Provinces, and that thereby the Army of his most Christian Majesty, which is in Flanders, may act with all the Superiority necessary for continuing their Conquests with Rapidity.

This Memorial shall conclude with an Observation, which appears too to be very important; that is, the absolute Necessity there is of preventing, without Loss of Time, the English and Austrians, in Concert with the Court of Dresden, from making the Progress in Russia and Poland, which they desire, in order to thwart the Operations of the King my Master, and thereby to weaken the principal Support of the Emperor against the Queen of Hungary in the Empire. And accordingly the Departure of the two Ministers, which his most Christian Majesty has been pleased to name for Poland and Russia, seems to require the greatest Dispatch.

These are the most humble Representations, which I take the Liberty to make in the Name of the King my Master, laying myself at the Feet of his most Christian Majesty, and assuring him of the Continuation of all my Zeal for the Good of the common Interests. Metz, Sept. 12, 1744.

The Marshal Count Schmettau.

N^o 4.

A Discourse held to his most Christian Majesty, and delivered afterwards in Writing.

AS I look upon your Majesty, not only as the greatest King in the World, but, at the same Time, as the honestest Man, so I do not hesitate to open my Heart to you. I would avoid, Sir, to have any Difference with your Ministers, or to sower them, whenever your Will, with Respect to what has been promised to the King my Master, is not put in Execution. Wherefore, Sir, as I only aim at the Good of Affairs, to preserve the strict Friendship and Union of your Majesty with the King my Mas-

ter, which is to render you always, you and your Posterity, Arbiters of the Balance of Europe, and procure your reciprocal Advantage, and that of your Subjects; so I shall endeavour to express myself, on the Matters which I bring before your Majesty, as plainly as if they were personally transacted between your Majesty and the King my Master; and as I have in that no concealed View, I dare flatter myself that your Majesty will find it expedient, for your Service, to keep the Secret, as often as you shall permit me to advertise you, when any Thing shall fail in the Execution of your Orders.

N^o 5.

Memorial for his most Christian Majesty only.

PRINCE Charles's Army, from the 12th of August, was a Third Part weaker than that of his most Christian Majesty: This latter had it in its Power till the 23^d of the same Month, which is 12 Days, to put itself in a Situation to have come up with the other, and to have given it Battle.

All Europe was attentive to the Conduct that would be held thereupon, and the King my Master was persuaded, more than any body, that the Austrian Army could not repass the Rhine without the Loss of half its Troops.

His Majesty was so much the more convinced of it, as he had been positively promised, that they would press so closely upon the Enemy's Army, that it should be impossible for it to undertake any Passage of the Rhine, without risking a very great Loss. The cruel Illness of his most Christian Majesty prevented my having the Honour to approach him, in order to represent to him what passed with Respect to the Austrian Army; and the Memorials which I delivered on that Subject, could not be read to his said Majesty, for the same Reason of his Illness.

I had made, by the said Memorials, strong Instances upon all that I thought might have been executed from one Day to another, and which was not done; especially that from Molsheim as far as the Soure, which is but four French Leagues, and from that River to Beintheim, which is three Leagues more, an Army so superior as that of his most Christian Majesty, had not been able in Twelve Days upon the Enemy, considering that the Dispositions for Provisions, Forage, Artillery, Bridges, and Openings of the Ways and Routes for the March of the said Army, might have been made with Ease, provided that all these Articles had been foreseen at the Time, when they should have proposed to approach so close to the Enemy, that they should not have again lost Sight of them, and that it would not have been easy for them to have stolen away, in or-



may think thereupon; but I ought to believe, that neither his Conduct in the Passage of the Schreck, if your Majesty is informed of all the Particulars, nor his Complaisance in approving all the miserable Management of M. de Noailles, nor his Halt on the 22d at Hochfeld, which even Noailles disapproves, nor the Manner in which he acts at present, can possibly please your Majesty. The Marshal Belleisle is of the same Opinion, and in that Supposition we have already consulted between us who might be proposed for the Command of that Army, who may at the same Time be agreeable to your Majesty, and to the Emperor; the rather as Seckendorff, since last Year, has several Times given Hints that he wished nothing but to retire; and that so this Man, whether by Age, or I know not what other Reason, is become quite another from what I ever knew him, and takes Things in so wrong a Manner, as may overturn the whole Machine; and this is the greatest Difficulty we meet with, with Regard to the whole Plan of Operations, whether for the Remainder of this Campaign, or that of the ensuing one.

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Memorial for his most Christian Majesty only.

PRINCE Charles's Army, from the 12th of August, was a Third Part weaker than that of his most Christian Majesty: This latter had it in its Power till the 23d of the same Month, which is 12 Days, to put itself in a Situation to have come up with the other, and to have given it Battle.

All Europe was attentive to the Conduct that would be held thereupon, and the King my Master was persuaded, more than any body, that the Austrian Army could not repass the Rhine without the Loss of half its Troops.

His Majesty was so much the more convinced of it, as he had been positively promised, that they would press so closely upon the Enemy's Army, that it should be impossible for it to undertake any Passage of the Rhine, without risking a very great Loss. The cruel Illness of his most Christian Majesty prevented my having the Honour to approach him, in order to represent to him what passed with Respect to the Austrian Army; and the Memorials which I delivered on that Subject, could not be read to his said Majesty, for the same Reason of his Illness.

I had made, by the said Memorials, strong Instances upon all that I thought might have been executed from one Day to another, and which was not done; especially that from Molsheim as far as the Soure, which is but four French Leagues, and from that River to Beinsheim, which is three Leagues more, an Army so superior as that of his most Christian Majesty, had not been able in Twelve Days upon the Enemy, considering that the Dispositions for Provisions, Forage, Artillery, Bridges, and Openings of the Ways and Routes for the March of the said Army, might have been made with Ease, provided that all these Articles had been foreseen at the Time, when they should have proposed to approach so close to the Enemy, that they should not have again lost Sight of them, and that it would not have been easy for them to have stolen away, in or-

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der to repass the Rhine, without being attacked.

The Austrian Army was known to be encamped the 17th of August upon the Eminencies of Brompt, on the other Side of the Soure, which gave the Army of his most Christian Majesty the Liberty to march, with the usual Precautions, in as many Columns as might have been thought necessary, for its coming and forming itself on the 17th of August on the River Souffel, at a League from Strasbourg, so much the rather, as it might, during the Halt which it had made the 16th of August, have provided Bread for four Days. The Artillery might also, from the 12th to the 17th, have had Time enough to arrive there.

Nothing ought to have hindered them on the 18th of August from marching in the same Manner, by leaving the Wood of Brompt on the Right, as far as the Rorbach, and pushing the Head of all the Grenadiers and Dragoons in the Army, up to the Soure, over-against Hochfeld, from which Post the Duke of Harcourt was distant, the two last Days, but one League. Nothing ought to have hindered the Passing the Soure the 19th, and coming up to the Enemy, and when even they had then halted on the 20th, (which in a Conjunction like that, wherein they found themselves, was not absolutely necessary) they would have had the 21st, the 22d, and half the 23d, to attack the Enemy's Army, or at least to have pressed it so closely, without the Light Troops being able to cover it, that it would have been impossible for it to have undertaken to defile by its Bridges, without their having destroyed half of the said Army.

One might still farther take Notice of other Articles, as that of a full Moon on the 23d to the 24th of August, when it was as light as Day; That they gave Time to the Enemy, already quite in Confusion, to pass the rest of their Infantry, and their Arrear Guard, over the Rhine, on their Bridges, although the whole Army of his most Christian Majesty was but Half a League from thence; being, that the Enemy did not cease passing over their Bridges till the Dawn of the Day on the 24th of August; and that they would have burnt their Bridges sooner than they did (knowing the Army of France was so near them) if they had not finished Passing the Rhine at Day-break the 24th of August.

Moreover, the Pursuit of the Austrian Army on the other Side of the Rhine, was carried on with so much Lukewarmness, (because the Corps, which were to sustain the Detachments sent to the Pursuit of the Enemy, did not follow quick enough) that it produced no Manner of Effect; and that the Enemy continued their Route with the same Facility.

But as the Business is at present to endeavour to remedy the Ill which has happened, and that we must set out from the Ground we are now upon, I think I am indispensably obliged, for the Good of the common Interests, humbly to beseech his most Christian Majesty, that he will be pleased to give his Consent to the three following Articles.

1°. That the six Battalions and 16 Squadrons, which are wanting to compleat the 50 Battalions and the 80 Squadrons, of which the Imperial Army ought to be composed, be taken out of the Troops of his most Christian Majesty, and that they join the Imperial Army, as soon as possible, with eight Battering Pieces, four Mortars, their Implements, and Pontons designed for that Army.

2°. That a Plan of Operations be made for the Remainder of this Campaign.

3°. That the same be done for the Position of the Troops during the next Winter.

4°. And, lastly, that a Plan of Operations be made for next Year, within the Month of October next.

The Orders of the King my Master upon this last Article are so strict, that I cannot possibly depart in any Point whatsoever from them. His Majesty desiring to know betimes, what will be the Operations of the next Campaign, that he may take just Measures to act in Concert, and to avoid committing the Faults of the three preceding Campaigns.

The King my Master will not fail to send respectively his Plan of Operations, that we may proceed in a perfect Concert on both Sides.

Metz. Sept.

Marshal Count de Schmettau.

12, 1744.

From the Head Quarters of the Saxon Auxiliary Corps at Hodietitz, the 26th of Oct. N. S.

Upon the 21st the Saxon Troops left Milin, and marched that Day to the Neighbourhood of Lichowy, where they encamped. The Duke of Saxe Weissenfeld's set out at Day-break for Wosleczan, in order to have an Interview with Prince Charles. His Highness dined there, and gave the Word to the Austrian Army.

Upon the 22d the Troops continued their March, and the Junction of the two Armies was made that Day in such a Manner, that the Right Wing of the Saxons touched the Left Wing of the Austrians. The same Day the Duke of Weissenfelds received Advice of the March of three Pulcks of Tartars coming from Poland, and that they were to begin to enter the Circle of Beraun that Day.

Upon the 23d the Saxons halted. The 10 Companies of Grenadiers, with a Train of Artillery, and a Convoy of Warlike Stores, under

der the Conduct of Major General Wilster, were to arrive this Day at Milin.

Upon the 24th the Troops fixed their Camp here. The same Day the Duke of Weissenfelds received Advice, that the whole Prussian Army made a Shew as if they intended to attack the Left Wing of the Combined Army, which was composed of Saxon Troops: Thereupon his Serene Highness having demanded a Reinforcement of Prince Charles, who sent him immediately 35 Squadrons, under the Command of Lieutenant Feldt Marshal Bernes, and six Battalions of Hungarian Infantry, under the Command of Feldt Marshal Lieutenant Prince Piccolomini, as also the Corps of Hussars under General Nadafti, the Saxons drew up in Order of Battle, and remained the greatest Part of the Night of the 25th under Arms, in Expectation of being attacked by the Prussians the Day after; but the Prussians having seen the good Dispositions which had been made to receive them, made a Motion to the Left, and retired to their old Camp.

Errata in last Tuesday's Gazette.

P. 1. Col. 2. the 14th Line from the Bottom, for having read has. P. 2. Col. 2. 1. 2, and 3. read to accede to which (that is to say, to forge their own Fetters) the greater Part of the Empire. P. 3. Col. 2. 1. 20. after solicit dele of. P. 4. Col. 1. 1. 3. for Pardubitz read Pardubitz.

Whitehall, Oct. 20, 1744.

Whereas it has been represented to his Majesty, That on Thursday the 20th Day of September last, Twenty Sheep, the Property of Benjamin Banks the Elder, of Kensington, Butcher, which were at Grass in a Field near Kensington Gravel Pits, were found killed, and the Fat taken out of them: And whereas on Tuesday the 9th Day of this Instant October, about Seven o'Clock in the Morning, Twenty-two Ewe Sheep, most of them in Lamb, belonging to George Gadby, of the Parish of Long Strawkley in the County of Bucks, Grazier, were found, in a Field at Coppot's Farm, in the Parish of Fryon Barnet, in the County of Middlesex, with their Throats cut, their Bodies opened, and all their Fat taken out, and carried away: His Majesty, for the better discovering and bringing to Justice the Person or Persons concerned in the Crimes aforesaid, is pleased to promise his most gracious Pardon to any one of them, who shall discover his Accomplice or Accomplices, so as he, she, or they may be apprehended and convicted thereof.

HOLLES NEWCASTLE.

Custom-house, London, October 25, 1744.

Whereas Information upon Oath has been given to the Hon. the Commissioners of his Majesty's Customs, That James Liss, of Ashington in the County of Sussex, Miller, Stephen Parson, of the same, Labourer, Edward Parson, of Chilmington, William Mills, William Bodger, and James Blondell, all notorious Smugglers, together with divers other evil disposed Persons,

at present unknown, do ride in and about Ashington and the Parts thereto adjacent in the County of Sussex, armed with Fire Arms, Hangers, and other dangerous Weapons, to the great Terror of many of his Majesty's Subjects in that Part of the Country, several of whom have been assaulted, beaten and wounded in a most cruel and barbarous Manner, so that the Lives of some of the Persons so assaulted and beaten are despaired of, and the Lives of others are threaten'd; the Houses of the several Persons so attacked have been broke into, and the most violent Outrages committed therein, and Attempts have been made to set Fire to the same, under Suspicion that they are aiding and assisting in discovering the illicit Practices of the said Offenders, and in protecting the Persons of such as do. The said Commissioners of his Majesty's Customs, in order to bring such Offenders to Justice, and the more effectually to put a Stop to such outrageous and violent Proceedings, do hereby promise a Reward of Fifty Pounds to any Person or Persons who shall apprehend the said Offenders, or any or either of them, so that they may be dealt with according to Law: To be paid by the Receiver General of his Majesty's Customs, on Conviction of any one or more of the Offenders.

Signed by Order of the Commissioners,
Wm. Wood, Secretary.

Christ's Hospital, London, Nov. 3, 1744.

Whereas John West, late of London, Scrivener, and Frances his Wife, both deceased, did in their several Life-times convey to the Governors of Christ's Hospital, London, divers Estates in and about the City of London, and elsewhere, for the Annual Payment of Five Pounds to poor Men and Women, of the Age of Fifty Years or upwards, during their natural Lives, and directed that their Relations by Consanguinity shall have Preference: The Governors of the said Hospital therefore hereby give Notice, That if any Person or Persons, related to the said John West, or to Frances his Wife as aforesaid, who stand in Need or desire the Benefit of the said Charity, shall not, in Forty Days from the Day of the Date hereof, apply themselves to the said Governors, at the Compting-House in the said Hospital, and make out their Relation to the Donors, they will be excluded the Benefit of the said Charity.

Wm. Brocket.

Bristol, October 15, 1744.

Notice is hereby given to all Officers, Sailors, &c. belonging to the Southwell Privateer, lately commanded by Captain John Wingfield deceased, that a Dividend will be made on Thursday Morning the 8th of November next, at the Coffee-house in the Square, on Account of the following Ships taken and retaken by her.

La Reine des Anges, from St. Domingo.

Duke of Argyll, Martin, and William, all three from Virginia.

L'Heureuse Union, from Cadix.

The Payments to continue every Monday and Thursday till completed.

General Post-Office, London, July 25, 1744.

Post-Chaises between London and Norwich, and London and Cambridge.

This is to acquaint the Publick, That the several Post-Masters on the Road between London and Norwich, and London and Cambridge, are ready to furnish